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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 2818

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, XE

SUBJECT: REPORT BY EXPERT GROUP ON THE FAR EAST

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST
PREPARED BY THE NATO EXPERT GROUP WHICH MET IN BRUSSELS MAY 5-7, 1975.

THE REPORT HAS NOT YET BEEN SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAC.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST
REPORT BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS

PART I: CHINA

INTERNAL SITUATION

1. THE 4TH NATIONAL PEOPLES ASSEMBLY WOULD SEEM TO HAVE
SETTLED MANY OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS: A FULL GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN
NOMINATED AT LAST, A NEW CONSTITUTION PROMULGATED AND THE
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MILITARY HIGH COMMAND RE-ESTABLISHED. HOWEVER, IT CANNOT BE
ASSUMED THAT COMPLETE INTERNAL STABILITY HAS BEEN RESTORED
ALTHOUGH THE PARTY WOULD NOW SEEM TO HAVE REGAINED ITS
AUTHORITY AND THIS IN ITSELF REPRESENTS THE RETURN OF A

STABILIZING FACTOR TO CHINESE POLITICAL LIFE.

2. THE MODERATES HAVE CERTAINLY CONSOLIDATED THEIR GAINS. THE POSITION OF CHOU EN-LAI HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE SPECTACULAR RISE OF TENG HSIAO-PING WHO CONCENTRATES A LOT OF POWER IN HIS HANDS (VICE-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE PARTY, MEMBERSHIP OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, NOMINATION AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND FIRST VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE PARTY'S MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE). THIS POLITICAL COME-BACK IS IN MARKED CONTRAST TO TENG'S DIS-GRACE DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

3. ALONGSIDE THAT OF TENG, HOWEVER, THE PROMOTION OF THE HARD-LINE RADICAL CHANG CHUN-CHIAO IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT. A MEMBER OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, HE ALSO BECOMES A DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AS WELL AS HEAD OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.

4. THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS OF A SHARING OF POWER BETWEEN THE TWO MAJOR TENDENCIES, WITH THE MODERATES, HOWEVER, RETAINING A BIG ADVANTAGE. IT IS NOTICEABLE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS A MAJORITY OF MODERATES AND NONE OF THE LEADING RADICALS, BUT THAT THE LATTER ARE STRONGLY REPRESENTED WITHIN THE PARTY.

5. THE MORAL PRESTIGE OF MAO TSE-TUNG REMAINS VERY GREAT AND, ALTHOUGH BY PERSONAL CHOICE HE LINES UP PERIODICALLY WITH THE "LEFT", HE SEEMS CONTENT AT PRESENT TO ACCEPT A RECONCILIATION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION.

6. THE NEW CONSTITUTION SEEMS TO BE WORKING IN THE SAME DIRECTION. OF LEFTISH INSPIRATION, IT PLACES THE STATE UNDER PARTY CONTROL, RESTRICTS CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND AT THE SAME TIME RETAINS CERTAIN MODERATE FEATURES ESSENTIAL TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

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7. A SIMILAR DUALITY IS NOTICEABLE IN CHINESE POLITICAL LIFE SINCE THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY. THE PROPAGANDA IS IDEOLOGICALLY FAR LEFT AND MILITANT, ALTHOUGH AT THE SAME TIME THE COUNTRY HANKERS AFTER RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO ENABLE IT TO TAKE ITS PLACE AMONG THE GREAT POWERS.

8. THE ARMY, WHILE IT HAS LOST SOME OF THE GROUND IT OCCUPIED A FEW YEARS AGO, REMAINS A POLITICAL FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT, ALL IN ALL, IT CONTINUES TO THROW ITS WEIGHT ON THE SIDE OF THE "MODERATES". HOWEVER, IT IS PROBABLY STILL SUBJECT TO HIERARCHICAL INFLUENCES, AS IS INDICATED BY THE PRESENCE OF CHANG CHUN-CHIAO AT THE HEAD OF ITS POLITICAL DEPARTMENT.

9. AS TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE ASSUMPTIONS: EITHER THERE WILL BE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FACTIONS, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A PERMANENT STATE OF TENSION BUT NO DIRECT THREAT TO NATIONAL ECONOMIC STABILITY, OR THE POWER STRUGGLE AMONG THE LEADERSHIP WILL CONTINUE AND THE PRESENT MODUS VIVENDI IS ONLY A PRECARIOUS COMPROMISE.

10. THE SECOND POSSIBILITY SEEMS THE MORE LIKELY, THOUGH THE IMPENDING PROBLEM OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S SUCCESSION FORCES THE PARTIES TO EXERCISE MODERATION SO AS TO AVOID PLUNGING THE COUNTRY INTO A STATE OF CHAOS LIKE THAT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

FOREIGN POLICY

11. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR REMAIN POOR. EACH SIDE CONTINUES TO ATTACK THE OTHER BITTERLY AND THE CHINESE HAVE STILL NOT RELEASED THE HELICOPTER CREW CAPTURED OVER A YEAR AGO.

12. HOWEVER, AT THE FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY CHOU EN-LAI INTIMATED THAT LIMITED AGREEMENTS WERE POSSIBLE. FOR TACTICAL REASONS, AND ALSO IN ORDER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE TREND IN THE EAST-WEST BALANCE OF FORCES, PEKING MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO ADOPT A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS MOSCOW WHICH COULD LEAD, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO A REDUCTION IN FRONTIER TENSION.

13. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TO, AND RELATIONSHIP WITH, WESTERN EUROPE SEEMS GENERALLY UNCHANGED FROM 1974. IT CONTINUES TO SEE
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EUROPE AS THE FOCUS OF SUPER-POWER "CONTENTION" AND TO ARGUE THAT THE USSR "MAKES A FEINT TO THE EAST WHILE ATTACKING IN THE WEST". IT HAS INTENSIFIED ITS EXHORTATIONS TO WESTERN EUROPE AND TO MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE TO REMAIN UNITED IN THE FACE OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND TO DISTRUST ALL RUSSIAN PROFESSIONS OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE AND DETENTE. SIR CHRISTOPHER SOAMES HAS BEEN INVITED TO CHINA IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EEC COMMISSIONER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

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14. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT TROUBLED OVER CONTRADICTIONS. PEKING ADVOCATES SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE "SECOND WORLD" AND THE THIRD WORLD, BUT CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE POLICY OF THE LATTER ON RAW MATERIALS. THE RESULT OF THIS ATTITUDE IS TO WEAKEN ECONOMICALLY EUROPE WHICH CHINA IS SEEKING TO MOBILIZE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

15. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ARE DEVELOPING MODERATELY. POLITICALLY, THE CHINESE WOULD PREFER MORE FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE RELATIONSHIP. COMMERCIALY, BILATERAL TRADE IS LIKELY TO FALL SIGNIFICANTLY IN 1975 WITH A PROBABLE DECREASE IN CHINESE PURCHASES OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AS A RESULT OF BETTER DOMESTIC HARVESTS. THE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE TESTED WHEN PRESIDENT FORD VISITS PEKING IN THE AUTUMN.

16. THE PROBLEM OF TAIWAN REMAINS AN OBSTACLE TO A GREATER REAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. THE CHINESE WILL WANT TO SEE HOW MATTERS DEVELOP FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

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17. THE DOMINANT THEME OF CHINESE POLICY HAS CONTINUED TO BE THE CULTIVATION OF THE THIRD WORLD AND EXHORTATIONS TO ITS MEMBERS TO CONFRONT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND SUPER-POWERS FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH BASED ON THIRD WORLD RESOURCE CONTROL. HOWEVER CHINA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE WHENEVER THEY CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE THIRD WORLD.

18. RELATIONS WITH SOUTH-EAST ASIA REMAIN CRUCIAL BUT UNCERTAIN. DESPITE CHINA'S CONTINUED PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FOR SOME REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN THE AREA, COUNTRIES OF ASEAN-FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF MALAYSIA - ARE MOVING HESITANTLY TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF THE PRC.

19. THE CALUALATIONS OF THE ASEAN STATES HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN INJECTED WITH AN INCREASED NOTE OF URGENCY AS CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM, ARE NOW UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL. WHILE, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ITS PURE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY,

CHINA CANNOT BUT BE DELIGHTED AT THE COMMUNIST VICTORIES IN BOTH STATES, FROM THE VERY DIFFERENT VIEW-POINT OF STRICT NATIONAL INTEREST CALCULATIONS IT MAY WELL BE CONCERNED AT THE EXPANSION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE POWER NOT ONLY THROUGHOUT VIETNAM BUT ALSO IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, WEHRE PEKING'S PROTEGE SIHANOUK WOULD APPEAR VERY MUCH BEHOLDEN TO A POSSIBLY HANOI-ORIENTED KHMER ROUGE. QUITE APART FROM THE FACT OF A VICTORIOUS VIETNAM ON ITS SOUTHERN FLANK, CHINA MAY WELL CALCULATE THERE IS LESS LIKELY TO BE A COINCIDENCE OF INTEREST BETWEEN HANOI AND PEKING THAN BETWEEN HANOI AND MOSCOW, AND CHINA'S TRADITIONAL FEARS OF ENCIRCLEMENT BY THE USSR MAY THEN WELL BE EXACERBATED.

PART II: JAPAN

INTERNAL SITUATION

20. THE UNCERTAINTY WHICH FACED THE JAPAN RULING PARTY AT THE TIME OF OUR LAST REPORT HAS BEEN LARGELY RESOLVED. APPOINTED INITIALLY AS A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE, MR. MIKI HAS BEGUN TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S FITNESS TO GOVERN ALTHOUGH HIS OWN POWER BASE REMAINS WEAK. IN ORDER TO CARRY THROUGH HIS AMBITIOUS PROGRAMME HE MUST RETAIN AT LEAST THE TACIT SUPPORT OF HIS MORE POWERFUL RIVALS OF WHOM MR. FUKUDA AND MR. OHIRA ARE THE STRONGEST. OPPOSITION TO THE SDP GOVERNMENT
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REMAINS UNCO-ORDINATED AS WAS SHOWN BY THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF THE PARTY IN THE APRIL LOCAL ELECTIONS.

21. THE UPWARD TREND IN LDP'S FORTUNES IS PARTLY DUE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINED HANDLING OF JAPAN'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THE APRIL 1975 FIGURES REVEAL THAT THE INFLATION RATE HAS BEEN REDUCED TO 13.4 PERCENT FROM A HIGH OF 26.3 PERCENT IN FEBRUARY 1974 AND THE RATE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION HAS RESUMED AN UPWARD CLIMB. THERE ARE GOOD REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO LIMIT THE SPRING WAGE INCREASES TO AROUND ITS TARGET OF 15 PERCENT. THE JAPANESE RECOVERY FROM THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE OIL CRISIS IS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT THE OVERALL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT WAS REDUCED FROM US \$13 BILLION IN FISCAL YEAR 1973-74 TO US \$3.4 BILLION IN FISCAL YEAR 1974-75.

FOREIGN POLICY

22. A FURTHER REASON FOR SATISFACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN THE PURSUIT OF AN INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR THE TREATY OF GOODNEIGHBOURLINESS AND CO-OPERATION WERE FIRMLY REJECTED AND IN SPITE OF MR. MIYAZAWA'S VISIT TO MOSCOW IN JANUARY, PROGRESS ON A PEACE TREATY IS BLOCKED BY THE ISSUE OF THE RETURN OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES TO JAPAN. THE JAPANESE HAVE SHOWN RELUCTANCE TO INVEST HEAVILY IN SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES, DUE TO CONSIDERATION OF BUSINESS MERITS, A LACK OF AMERICAN PARTICIPATION, AND CHINESE CONCERN. ON THE OTHER HAND RELATIONS WITH CHINA HAVE MAINTAINED PROGRESS EVEN THOUGH

NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP ARE NOT YET CONCLUDED. JAPAN'S EXPANDING TRADE WITH CHINA HAS NOW OVERTAKEN HER TRADE WITH TAIWAN. THIS AND THE DEATH OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK HAVE REDUCED THE INFLUENCE OF THOSE WHO HAVE TRIED TO LIMIT THE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA. JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH CHINA HAVE INCREASED MORE THAN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THIS HAS PUT INTO QUESTION THE FORMER GOAL OF EQUIDISTANCE BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW.

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23. THE TREND TOWARDS A MORE INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY WAS ALSO ILLUSTRATED BY JAPAN'S SEPARATE AND RAPID AGREEMENTS WITH OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A "RESOURCES DIPLOMACY". IT IS AS A RESULT CONCERNED TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE ESPECIALLY IN ASIA AND THIS HAS DETERMINED ITS POLICY TOWARDS INDO-CHINA. NEVERTHELESS JAPAN REMAINS FULLY AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN WORLD. IT ATTACHES INCREASING VALUE TO CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM BOTH IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES AND BILATERALLY. THE NEED FOR A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC BY THE EVENTS IN INDO-CHINA. THE RE-AFFIRMATION OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENCE OF JAPAN WAS THEREFORE VITAL.

PART III:KOREA

24. THE REPRECUSIONS OF EVENTS IN INDO-CHINA THREATEN THE SITUATION IN KOREA. KIM IL SUNG'S HURRIEDLY ARRANGED VISIT TO

PEKING AND HIS MILITANT SPEECH THERE SUGGESTS THAT HE BELIEVES
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THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO DEFEND SOUTH KOREA SHOULD BE TESTED. NORTH KOREA'S DETERMINATION TO SECURE REUNIFICATION IF NECESSARY BY FORCE WAS FURTHER DEMONSTRATED BY THE DISCOVERY OF LARGE TUNNEL NETWORKS INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE SOUTH AND BY THE INCURSION INTO TRADITIONAL SOUTH KOREAN FISHING WATERS.

25. THIS POLICY POSED A DILEMMA FOR CHINA. IT DOES NOT WANT TO UPSET THE STATUS QUO ON ITS NORTH-EASTERN FLANK, BUT THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REJECT KIM'S OVERTURES OUT OF HAND. WHILE IN THE COMMUNIQUE IT FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE DPRK AS "THE SOLE LEGAL SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE KOREAN NATION", IT STRESSED THE NEED FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. KIM IS EXPECTED TO SEEK SOVIET SUPPORT WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO BE FORTH-COMING GIVEN THE SOVIET PURSUIT OF A POLICY OF DETENTE.

26. THE DANGER REMAINS THAT KIM MIGHT CALCULATE THAT BOTH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE COMPELLED TO COME TO HIS AID IF HE COULD CREATE A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH TO WHICH HE REFERRED IN HIS PEKING SPEECH. HE WOULD CERTAINLY SEEK TO EXPLOIT ANY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE OF OPPOSITION TO THE SOMETIMES EXCESSIVELY HARSH POLICIES OF PRESIDENT PARK. THERE IS ALSO A DANGER THAT HE MIGHT SEEK TO TEST THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT BY CREATING MILITARY INCIDENTS.

PART IV: INDO-CHINA

27. THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON, UNLIKE THAT IN PHNOM-PENH HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ASSERT ITS INTERNATIONAL POSITION BY MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. SOME MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED CONTACTS.

28. CERTAIN MEMBERS ARE ALREADY GIVING HUMANITARIAN AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AND CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND EXPECT THAT BILATERAL AID PROGRAMMES WILL BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM.

29. ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES ARE GIVING FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO REQUESTS FOR ASYLUM FROM DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATS AND ALSO TO OTHER SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.

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30. THE DRAMATIC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH EARLY THIS YEAR WERE CLEARLY UNEXPECTED, NOT ONLY BY SAIGON, BUT BY HANOI AND ITS SUPPORTERS IN PEKING AND MOSCOW AS WELL. THE RAPID SUCCESSION OF EVENTS HAS FORCED SOME IMPROVISATION BY HANOI AND

A REASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA BY MOSCOW AND PEKING.

31. UNIFICATION IS THE COMMON AIM OF BOTH THE DRVN AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON, ALTHOUGH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHEN AND HOW THIS WILL HAPPEN.

32. WHILE INDO-CHINA IS LIKELY TO BECOME AN AREA OF CONTENTION FOR BOTH CHINA AND THE USSR, THE DRVN IS LIKELY TO TRY TO MAINTAIN AN EQUILIBRIUM IN ITS RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE USSR. HANOI, WITH THE BEST MILITARY FORCE IN THE AREA AND EXHILARATED BY ITS VICTORY, WILL BE TEMPTED TO ESTABLISH ITS LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH EAST ASIA.

3. IT WILL SEEK TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA BOTH AT THE GOVERNMENT LEVEL AND BY ENCOURAGING COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE AREA WHICH, IN ANY CASE, ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE DRVN VICTORY. THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR THEIR PART WILL ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE THEIR POSITION BY A REAPPRAISAL OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. THEY WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE REGION WILL BE THE SCENE OF A TRIANGULAR RIVALRY BETWEEN HANOI, PEKING AND MOSCOW. THE ABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA TO MAINTAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY UNDER

THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WILL DEPEND NOT ONLY ON HOW WELL THEY CAN BALANCE THOSE CONTENDING FORCES BUT ALSO ON THE SUPPORT THEY RECEIVE FROM THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD.

34. AT THIS STAGE, NOTHING MUCH IS KNOWN OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN CAMBODIA OR ITS LEADERS. MENTION IS OFTEN MADE OF DIFFERENT ALIGNMENTS BUT ONLY TIME WILL TELL HOW AND BY WHOM THIS COUNTRY WILL BE GOVERNED. EVENTS SO FAR DO NOT SUGGEST THAT CAMBODIA IS IN ANY HURRY TO DEVELOP ITS EXTERNAL CONTACTS.

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35. THAILAND IS ALREADY TAKING STEPS TO ADJUST ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS NEW NEIGHBOURS IN THE REGION. APPROACHES HAVE BEEN MADE TO ENTER INTO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA, THE DRVN AND NORTH KOREA WHILE PRESSING THE US TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES. HOWEVER, THAILAND WILL CONTINUE TO WANT CLOSE RELATIONS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES.

PART V: THE SUB-CONTINENT

36. INDIA HAS PURSUED A DETERMINED POLICY OF DEALING WITH ISSUES ALONG ITS BORDERS IN A VARIETY OF WAYS WHICH INDICATE ITS SELF-CONFIDENCE. BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS FLOWING FROM THE SIMLA AGREEMENT HAVE RESOLVED A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, YET MUTUAL SUSPICIONS REMAIN HIGH. DESPITE SOME CHINESE INITIATIVES TO WARM RELATIONS WITH INDIA THERE HAS BEEN NO NOTICEABLE MOVEMENT IN THE PRESENT QUITE COOL RELATIONS THAT HAVE EXISTED FOR OVER 13 YEARS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE SITUATION HAS NOT BEEN HELPED BY THE INDIAN ABSORPTION OF SIKKIM.

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37. INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION REMAIN VERY CLOSE EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN WILLING OR ABLE TO MEET INDIA'S MOST PRESSING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC NEEDS AND INDIA HAS FAILED TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO THE RUSSIANS ON SOME FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. INDIA, LIKE ASIAN COUNTRIES, HAS STILL NOT ENDORSED SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR AN ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM.

38. PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUES TO BE LARGELY INFLUENCED BY ITS FEAR OF INDIA WHICH HAS BECOME EVEN MORE DEEPLY TROOTED AS A RESULT OF THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST AND BY ITS CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.

39. INDIAN OCEAN. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO EXTEND ITS NAVAL INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. IT HAS NO NAVAL BASES IN THE SUB-CONTINENT, BUT SOVIET SHIPS CALL AT PORTS IN BOTH INDIA AND BANGLADESH. INDIA HAS NOT PROTESTED THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE ALTHOUGH IT HAS PROTESTED THE VISITS OF US FLEET UNITS TO THE AREA AND THE EXPANSION OF THE INSTALLATIONS AT DIEGO GARCIA.
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